1
Introd uction
In their book Values of Non-Atomic Games, Aumann and Shapley [1] define the value for spaces of nonatomic games as a map from the space of games into bounded finitely additive games that satisfies a list of plausible axioms: linearity, symmetry, positivity, and efficiency. One ofthe themes of the theory of values is to demonstrate that on given spaces of games this list of plausible axioms determines the value uniquely. One of the spaces of games that have been extensively studied is pNA, which is the closure of the linear space generated by the polynomials of nonatomic measures. Theorem B of [1] asserts that a unique value~exists on pNA and that II~II = 1. This chapter introduces a canonical way to approxi1)1ate games in pNA by games in pNA that are "identified" with finite games. These are the multilinear nonatomic games-that is, games v of the form v = F are mutually singular nonatomic measures. The approximation theorem yields short proofs to classic results, such as the uniqueness of the Aumann -Shapley value on pNA and the existence of the asymptotic value on pNA (see [1, Theorem F] ), as well as short proofs for some newer results such as the uniqueness of the 11value on pNA(I1) (see [4D. We also demonstrate the usefulness of our method by proving a generalization to pNA of Young's characterization [6 and Chapter 17 this volume] of the Shapley value without the linearity axiom, and by generalizing Young's characterization [7] of the Aumann-Shapley price mechanism. In the last chapter we use the ideas behind the multilinear approximation in order to supply an elementary proof to a classic result in analysis: the Weierstrass approximation theorem. 0~=~0 8*. A map~of a subset Q of BV into BV is called ejficientif, for every v E Q, (~v)(l) = vel). Let Qbe a symmetricsubspace ofBV. A value on Qisalinear, positive, efficient, and symmetric map of Q into FA. Let Q be a subspace ofBV. Q is an internal space if for every v E Q and every E > 0 there exist u, w E Q+ with v = w -u and IIvII> w(I) + u(I) -E. The importance of internal spaces in the theory of values follows. from [1, Propositions 4.7, 4.12] , where it was proven that every linear, positive, efficient map of an internal subspace of BV into FA is continuous and that the closure of an internal space is internal. These results provide a very efficient tool for deriving uniqueness theorems. One of the fundamental results of the theory of values of nonatomic games [1, Theorem B] is the existence. of a unique value on pNA. The uniqueness of the value on a dense subspace of pNA follows from [1, Proposition 6.1], and the uniqueness on pNA is obtained by showing that pNA is an internal space.
Let fl be a finite subfield ofCf6. The set of all atoms offl is denoted by 7r. The power set 21£ of 7ris identified naturally with fl, and thus a finite game on the players' set 7r is identified with a function w: fl~R , With Actually, IIwll = w+(I) + w-(I). Let Tn be the map from the set of all games into G(TI) given by Tnv = Vn,where Vnis the restriction to TI ofv. Note that Tn is linear, efficient, positive, and II Tn vII <: IIvII for every vEBV.
A carrier of a game v is a set l' in eg such that v(S) = v(S n 1') for every S E eg.Let Abe a probability measure in NA. The set of all games vin pNA having the property that every carrier of Ais a carrier of v is denoted by pNA(A). Equivalently, pNA(A) is the closed algebra generated by NA(A), where NA(A) denotes the space of all measures in NA that are absolutely continuous with respect to A. 
-(I), we have v = T).(w+) -T).(w-), which implies that IIvII< T).(w+)(I) + T).(w-)(I) = w+(I) + w-(I) = IIwll= IITnvll.
Because we also have IITnvll < IIvll,we get that Tn, and therefore, T)., is an the Shapley value for finite games. It is easy to verify that cf> maps ML(A,TI) into NA n ML(A,ll), that 1/1 maps Gill) into AGiTI), and that the diagrams (D1) and (D2) are commutative withf = cf> andg = 1/1 (e.g., use [5] and [1, note 1 on p. 166]). This gives us a very efficient tool to derive uniqueness theorems. The approximation theorem
We start with an inequality that holds in any normed algebra (X, 1111);that is, IlxY11< IlxlIllYII for every x, Y, EX. Let Xl' Xl' . . . , Xn be fixed elements in X. For every J = (JI ,jz, . . . ,A) E {1,2, . . . ,n)k denote the product ilf= 1Xjj = Xjl xh' . . . , xA by x(J). It follows that
Let D be the set of all J E {1,2, . . . ,n)k such that for every 1 < i < m < k,ji=l=jm,andletBbethesetofallJE (l,2, . . . ,n)kthatarenotin D.
Lemma 3. For every Xl' Xz, . . . , Xnin a normed algebra and for every integer k > 1 the following holds:
Proof: For every 1 < 1< n let B, = {J E B: 3 1 < i < m < k S.t.ji = jm = I).
Then B = U7-IB,. For every 1 < i < m < k let B:,m = {J E B,:ji = 
The result follows. . Proof: Because all operators Ehn are linear with nonn 1, the space Q consisting of all games v E pNA(A) for which Ekv~v is a closed subspace of pNA(A). Let y be a probability measure in ML(A,IIm). We will show that for every k:
Because ML(A,IIm)C ML(A,IIn) for every n > m, y E ML(A,IIn) for every n> m, so Eky = y for every n> m, which proves our claim for k= 1 y is a nonatomic probability measure on a standard measurable space.
Obviously Un E Q for every n> m (because Eh Un = Un for every p p :> n). Therefore yk E Q for every k:> 1. Finally, since U;=lIIn is dense in cfi, then NA n (U;-lML(A,IIn)) is dense in the space of all measures which are absolutely continuous w.r. t. A, and since pNA(A) is a Banach algebra it is the closed algebra generated by NA n (U;=lML(A,IIn)). This completes the proof. .
Internality
Let A be a probability measure in NA, and let (IIn);-l be an admissible sequence of finite fields. By (v) ML(A,IIn) is internal for every n :> 1. Because ML(A,IIn) ::) ML(A,IIm)for every n > m, u;= 1ML(A,II)n is a linear space; and because the union of internal spaces is an internal space (if . k-2
Because pNA = U;.pNA(A), it is also internal.
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The uniqueness of the value
The uniqueness of the Aumann-Shapley value on pNA is mainly the consequence of the internality of pNA that was proved in the previous section. However, the uniqueness of the Avalue onpNA(A), which cannot be based on internality observations alone, can also be derived by the methods developed here.
Let A be a nonatomic probability measure. A set Q of games is A-sym- The asymptotic value on pNA
In this section we will show that the asymptotic value exists in pNA. We will show that the asymptotic value of each v E pNA equals its AumannShapley value. Let v E pNA, let (TIn);:=1be an admissible sequence of finite fields, and let T E TI I'
We have to show that
Note that there exists a probability measure A E NA for which v E
pNA(A). Also note that for every UE ML(A,I1n), !JfUnn(S)= cpu(S) for every S E TIn. In particular, !Jfunn(T) = cpu(T). Finally, recall that EfIm maps pNA(A) into ML(A,I1m). Hence, I!Jfvnj T) -cf>v(T) I <: I!Jfvnj T) -!Jf(EfImv)njT)l+ Icp(EfImv)(T) -cf>v(T)I.
Because for every wE BY, IIwnmll <: IIwll and 1I!Jf11 = Ilcpli = 1, we deduce from the approximation theorem that 
(T US') -u(T)
for every S'~Sand Tin cf8. Strong positivity is a desirable property for values, and it is satisfied by the value on pNA as well as by any other known nonpathological value. The following theorem asserts that strong positivity and continuity can replace positivity and linearity in the characterization of the value on pNA. for every atom A of II for which Let then u, wE ML(A,TI) satisfy (5.2). Note that for every v E GA(TI) and every R E 'fb,
T"v(R)~s~v(S)
LEg~S Therefore, for every A' E 'fb,A' C A,
BEn, Bk;Tc;B~A Thus (2) implies that
for every A'~A and R in 'fb.H ence, by the strong positivity of 4;, we have Because for every probability measure A E NA + there exists an admissible sequence of finite fields, each of them has the a!?ove property, the proof of the theorem followsfrom the continuity of 4;. . Proof: For every 11E NA + for which -11 -< v -U -<11,we have u -11-< v -< u + 11. Therefore, by the properties of cP, cpu -11 <: cPv <: cPu + 11. Hence, -11 <: cPv -cPu <: 11, which implies that IIcPv-cpull <: 11(/). Becaus~the last inequality holds for every 11for which -11 -< v -U -<11,we get IIcPv-cPull <: Ilv -ulloo.
.
Let pNAoo be the II lloo-closedalgebra generated by NA. pNAoo is a II 11-dense subspace of pNA that contains NA as well as any game v = F We now turn to characterize the value on pNAoo without the linearity and positivity axioms. Both axioms will be replaced by the strong positivity axiom. We will not need any continuity assumption (compare with the analogous result in the previous chapter). Note that because Lemma 3 holds in any normed algebra, we can mimic the proof of Theorem 4 to get limn--ooE~v = v (in the 111100 norm) for every probability measure A E n NA, every admissible sequence of finite fields, and every v E pNAoo(A),
here pNAoo(A)is the II lloo-closedalgebra generated by NA(A). Therefore if cP: pNAoo~F A is a symmetric, efficient, strongly positive map that satisfies cf>(v+ 11)= cf>(v) + cf>(I1) for every v E pNAoo and for every 11E NA, then it coincides with cP (the Aumann-Shapley value) on a lliloo-dense subspace of pNAoo, and it is lliloo-continuous (by the lemma in this chap-.. ;=1 (1) for every n > 1 and for every (f,a) E fFn.
Let m > n > 1 and let n = (SI ,S2, . . . ,Sn) be an ordered partition of {l,2, . . . ,m}. We define n* :Rm~Rn by nf(x) = LjESjXj for every x E Rm and for every 1 < i < n. 
;.-for every 1 <j< n and for every i E Sj.
For each x, y E Rn denote x * y = (x I Yi, . . . ,xnYn) and for each A E R~+denote A-I = (1/,1,1' . . . , I/An).Also, for each functionfon Rn
A price mechanism IfIis resealing invariant if
for all A, a E R~+ and (f,a) E :¥n'
A price mechanism IfIis strongly monotone if E Da~1fI;(f,a) > 1fI;(g,a) x;
x; (4) for every n > 1, for every (f,a), (g,a) E :¥nand for every 1 < i < n. for every n > 1, for every (f,a) E :¥n and for every 1 < i < n.
Theorem 9. There exists a unique price mechanism on :¥ which is cost sharing, consistent, resealing invariant and strongly monotone. It is the Aumann -Shapley price mechanism. . Theorem 9 is a generalization of a result of Young [7] , who proved that the Aumann -Shapley price mechanism is the unique price mechanism which is cost sharing, strongly monotone and aggregation invariant, where aggregation invariance means that the price mechanism is covariant under linear transformations. The following example shows that consistency and resealing invariance are weaker than aggregation invariance even in the presence of the cost sharing axiom.
Example 10. For every n > 1, for every a E R~+, for every (f,a) E :¥n, and for every 1 <j< n denote si(f) = maxxEDaaflaxj (x). Define Let IfIbe a cost sharing, consistent, resealing invariant, strongly monotone price mechanism on gjp. For each n :> 1 and for each a E R~+ define lfIa: G(n)~Rn such that the following diagram will be commutative:
where i is the identity map of Rn, and (a * 1fI)(f,a) = a * (1fI(f,a». lfIais efficient, symmetric, and strongly positive since IfIis cost sharing, consistent and resealing invariant, and strongly monotone respectively. Therefore, by [6] , lfIais the Shapley value. Hence by [5] IfIcoincides with the Aumann-Shapley price mechanism cP on ML(a). Thus we have proven that IfIand cPcoincide on Un""l,aER~+ML(a). Let then n:> 1 and let a E R~+. We show that IfI= cP on gjP(a). For every k:> 1 let n(k) = (SI, . . . ,Sn) be the ordered partition of {l,2, . . . ,kn}, where for each 1 <:
, where aik) = ap/k for every j ESp, and letf(k) = fo n(k).
As IfIis consistent, for every 1 <: P <: n and every j E Sp, [ESp Thus for every 1 <p < n and for every E > 0 apllflp(f,a) -cpp(f,a) I < 4E.
As ap > 0 it follows that 1fI(f,a)= cp(f,a). .
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Bernstein's polynomials Let E> 0 and let n be an integer large enough such that If' (t2)-f'(tl)1 < E whenever It2 -t11< l/n. We will show that Ign(x) -fn(x) I < E 'Ix E Dn.
(1)
The theorem will follow by substituting x = (t,t, . . . ,t) in the last inequality.
We now prove (1). For each x E Dn let N(x) be the number of the indices i for which 0 < Xi < 1. Obviously 0 < N(x) < n. We will prove by induction on k that
Ign(x) -fn(x)! < kE/n whenever N(x) = k.
For x E Dn with N(x) = 0, x = Is for some S C {l,2, . . . ,n} and therefore gn(x) = fn(x). As.sume the claim has been proven for 0 < k < n.
We now prove it for k + 1. Let x E Dn with N(x) = k + 1. Let IE {l,2, . . . ,n} with 0 < Xl < 1. Since gn is a multilinear function, -xl) )E/n < (k + l)E/n .
since Xl(1 -Xl) < 1. .
